

## THE CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE IN 197 BC<sup>1</sup>

(PLATES I–II)

ACCOUNTS of the campaign and the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC have in general two serious defects: they do not consider the problems of supply on both sides, and they make no attempt to match the topographical details of the ancient accounts with the presumed scene of the engagement. When I came to study the problem of supply, I reached the conclusion that the place of the engagement had to be farther west than had hitherto been believed, and in October 1985 I visited that place and matched the details with it. The result is this article, which is divided into four parts: the campaign, my reconnaissance of the ground, the battle, and some criticisms of earlier interpretations. There are three Appendices: the Battle of 364 BC, ‘Dog-heads’ and the Roman Encampment.

### 1. *The campaign of 197 BC*

Polybius wrote the original account. He was able to gather information from participants and in particular from Aetolians, Romans and Macedonians, and many vivid touches show that he did so. His personal sympathies were in favour of Rome and against Macedonia; moreover, he had to be careful not to offend Roman readers and he tended to reproduce the Roman version of events. In particular Flamininus was to be portrayed as a brilliant general and the liberator of the Greeks. The account of Polybius was used by Livy, who was even more pro-Roman, by Plutarch, who was less biased and more accurate than Livy, and ultimately by Zonaras. Livy certainly (e.g. at xxxiii 10.8–9) and Plutarch probably used other sources also, as I suggested for operations of 198 BC in *JRS* lvi (1966) 52 n. 38.

In the latter part of 198 BC the Romans, the Aetolians and the Athamanians overran west Thessaly and southwest Thessaly. Philip held northeast Thessaly and the coastal part of southeast Thessaly (see FIG. 1). His natural line of defence for 197 BC was from Atrax (which had been stubbornly retained despite a determined attack) to Phthiotic Thebes along the line of the Karadag range. There were only two good routes through that range. One led from Phthiotic Thebes through the gap by Pherae to Larissa; this was covered by the Macedonian garrison at Thebes. The other, less easy, ran from Pharsalus via Palaepharsalus to Larissa either direct or

<sup>1</sup> In preparing and writing this article I have been much helped by Dr M. B. Hatzopoulos. I have benefited also from comments when I described the battle at the National Hellenic Research Foundation and at the University of Pennsylvania, and from the advice of Professor F. W. Walbank on the short version which is now published in *A history of Macedonia* iii (Oxford 1988). The following abbreviations are used:

Kromayer: J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland* ii (Berlin 1907) 57–85 etc.  
Leake: W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* iv (London 1835)  
Pritchett: W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in ancient Greek topography* ii (Berkeley 1969)  
Morgan: J. D. Morgan, ‘Palaepharsalus—the

battle and the town’, *AJA* lxxxvii (1983) 23–54

Walbank C: F. W. Walbank, *A historical commentary on Polybius* ii (1967)

The photographs from which the Plates are made were taken by Dr Hatzopoulos and Margaret Hammond, and the Figures were drawn by the author, who used the best available Staff Maps for Figs. 3 and 4. The book of I. A. Demetriades, *Ἡ μάχη τῶν Κυνῶς Κεφαλῶν* (Athens 1939), was not available for consultation; it aimed to show the relationship of the terrain to Kromayer’s battle-scene, which I reject for other reasons. Pritchett 137 n. 10 referred to it. The Editor and his adviser, Dr J. D. Morgan, made comments on the first draft, some of which have helped to improve this text; I am most grateful to them.

through Crannon. Philip maintained his garrison at Pharsalus (Plb. xviii 3.12); moreover, he removed the people and destroyed the buildings of five cities in the Enipeus valley (Livy xxxii 13.6–9). The Aetolians, who would otherwise have sacked these cities themselves (*cf.* Livy xxxii 13.10–15), accused Philip of pointless brutality (Plb. xviii 3.9). However, he clearly had a strategic purpose in mind. He expected the Romans to deliver an attack in 197 BC from southwest Thessaly either on the Palaepharsalus pass through the Karadag range or up the Enipeus valley against Phthiotic Thebes or both; in these cases he would have denied them the crops and foodstuffs of the extremely fertile Enipeus valley. This was a shrewd calculation, based on experience. For in the latter part of 198 BC the Romans had had to withdraw from northwest Thessaly precisely because they were in a region ‘devastated by the ravages of war and far from the sea’ (Livy xxxii 18.2), and Flamininus had then headed for the coast, because the supplies of the army were provided mainly by the fleet.<sup>2</sup> Philip maintained his garrisons also in southeast Thessaly: at Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias, his main base on the Gulf of Pagasae. Why did he not withdraw them? He could have used the garrison troops to strengthen his army, instead of having to call up boys under age and veterans over age, as he did, for the coming campaign. We must conclude, then, that these cities had an important place in his defence plan. In other words Philip hoped to deflect the Roman advance away from the coast and into western Thessaly, where a natural route ran from Xyniae to Pharsalus. With this strategy in prospect he will have built up depots of supplies at Larissa on the Peneus river as his base for manoeuvre, and at Demetrias, Thebes, Larissa Cremaste and Echinus during the winter of 198–197 BC.

Because he had recruits to train, Philip mustered his army early ‘just after the vernal equinox’, on 24 March 197 BC, and he kept it ‘under training daily’ at Diium, where it could be supplied from within Macedonia, ‘while he was awaiting the enemy’ (Livy xxxiii 3.5 ‘hostem opperiebatur’). In due course he heard that the Roman army had left Elatea in Phocis; he exhorted his men and continued to await the enemy (xxxiii 3.11–4.5 ‘hostem opperiebatur’). After an unspecified interval he moved his army forward to Larissa (xxxiii 6.3). There the news reached him that the Roman army was encamped ‘round Thebes’, i.e., Phthiotic Thebes; and by the evening of the next day Philip, having marched some 38 km, encamped  $5\frac{1}{2}$  km short of Pherae (see FIG. 1). He arrived there ‘in good time’ (Plb. xviii 19.4, ἐν ὥρῃ) and told his men to get themselves in trim for the morrow. He presumably expected to engage the Roman army, which he thought was 15 km away near Phthiotic Thebes. Next day he sent his light forces ahead in the dark to cross the ridge which forms the head of the pass just south of Pherae. Towards dawn his main army started to march. At that moment he learned that his light forces had met enemy light forces at the ridge while it was still dark. He withdrew to his camp. He had failed to reach his intended objective, the vicinity of Phthiotic Thebes.

We turn now to Flamininus, who was wintering at Elatea in Phocis with his army of two legions. Attalus of Pergamum was wintering with the fleet at Cenchreae near Corinth (Livy xxxii 40.9). ‘At the beginning of spring’, around mid-March,<sup>3</sup> Flamininus summoned Attalus and on his arrival they set off with one legion not northwards but southwards for Thebes in Boeotia. There immediately Flamininus tricked the leaders of the Boeotian League into changing their alliance from Macedonia to Rome. After some delay, which was due to the illness of Attalus, Flamininus returned to Elatea, collected the other legion and marched by the coastal route via Thronium and Thermopylae to Heraclea, to which the Council of the Aetolian League had been summoned by pre-arrangement (see FIG. 1). In his presence the Council decided how many troops to provide from their army, already mustered in case Philip should attack. Three days later Flamininus camped at Xyniae and ‘began to wait; there was no delay from the

<sup>2</sup> For this see Livy xxxii 9.6–8; 14.7; 15.5–7; 16.4; and 18.2–5.

<sup>3</sup> Livy xxxiii 1.1 ‘initio veris’ preceded the mustering

of the Macedonian army at Diium. If we allow ten days for the call-up, Philip sent out his orders around 14 March, ‘primo vere’ (xxxiii 3.1).




FIG. 1. The campaign in Thessaly in 197 BC

× M Macedonian camp    × R Roman camp

Heights in metres

— ancient road

- - - cross-country route

Aetolians' (xxxiii 3.8–9). On the arrival of the Aetolians, 'at speed he broke camp', moved into Phthiotic territory where he was joined by a force of Cretans and 'not so much later' by Amynder and his Athamanian troops, and headed for Phthiotic Thebes. Previous warning of Flamininus' line of march must have been given to the Cretans and the Athamanians for them to join him thus. He hoped that a pro-Roman leader at Thebes—also warned in advance—would betray the city from within. So Flamininus arrived with very few men probably near dawn; but this time the trick failed. He sent his men to cut suitable branches for fortifying a camp, since he had heard that Philip was somewhere in Thessaly, precise position unknown, and next day led his army forward 'slowly' (Plb. xviii 19.1 βᾶδην) and made his fortified camp 9 km south of Pherae (see FIG. 1). The slow rate of march shows that Flamininus was reaching his desired objective.

It was a brilliant operation. He had cut Philip off from the Macedonian garrisons at Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias and also from the foodstocks accumulated there. He knew that the ground ahead was unfavourable for the Macedonian phalanx. His own supply lines from Xyniae were safe; and if the Roman fleet should anchor in the Pagasaeon Gulf, as it had done in 198 BC,<sup>4</sup> a large force of marines could escort supplies to him from the supply-ships.

Conversely, Philip had made a very serious miscalculation. Now he was cut off from the garrisons and the supplies of Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias, he had lost contact with the southeastern sector of his defence line and he was faced by ground unsuitable for his phalanx. Worse still, he had come without adequate supplies; for he had counted on making contact with Demetrias and Phthiotic Thebes.

Next day there was fierce fighting between the forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry which each commander sent forward into the gap by Pherae, and the Aetolians were said by Polybius to have distinguished themselves (xviii 19.11). The ground round Pherae was broken up by drystone walls, small enclosures and plantations, and it was unsuitable for any heavy infantry formation, whether Macedonian or Roman. Thus neither commander was prepared to bring on a major battle. It might have suited Philip to stay and impose a stalemate, as he had done at the Aoi Stena, but on this occasion he lacked the supplies, especially for his cavalry mounts. So on the following day, presumably at or even before dawn, 'Philip began to march in the direction of Scotussa, being eager to supply himself from that city' (Plb. xviii 20.2 ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ἐφοδιάσασθαι), 'and thereafter, being well prepared (εὐτρεπῆς), to occupy ground suitable for his forces'. He intended to draw foodstuffs for his men from the city's stocks and to pasture his horses on the standing crops of cereals, which were still green.<sup>5</sup> He would then go on to adopt a suitable position, i.e., a narrow one with level ground in the centre for his phalanx and steep or rising ground on his flanks. Even more important, it had to be so placed that the supply-train from Larissa could reach him regularly. In short, it had to be close to or on the main road by Palaepharsalus. If he arrived in time, he would make contact with his garrison at Pharsalus.

Philip had regained the initiative. But Polybius and Livy preferred to pass over that point. Polybius said that Flamininus began to move his army 'at the same time as Philip' (xviii 20.3 ἄμα τῷ Φιλίππῳ). Livy had them both head for Scotussa 'as if by pre-arrangement' (xxxiii 6.8, 'velut ex praedicto'). The facts are likely to have been different. Flamininus would surely not have moved off westwards of his own accord; for such a move would have enabled Philip to proceed to Demetrias or Phthiotic Thebes, supply himself and block Flamininus from any contact with the Pagasaeon Gulf. Flamininus was well placed where he was. But when he realised that Philip had set off westwards—as his reconnaissance troops will have reported early in the day—he decided to move westwards himself, because above all he wanted to keep contact with

<sup>4</sup> At Cape Zelasium (Livy xxxi 46.7).

<sup>5</sup> This is certain from the timing of the events, to which we shall come later. It is clear from Plb. xviii 20.3

that the crops were standing in the fields. Scotussa was a large city with a circuit-wall of some 3 km, and its territory was almost all to the west of the city.




Fig. 2. The Scene of the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC.  
 (H) = Hammond's (K) = Kromayer's (P) = Pritchett's site for the battle.  
 - - - modern road ——— ancient road.  
 Ancient names in italics. Heights in metres.

Philip and if possible to force a decisive battle.<sup>6</sup> Philip must have had two or three hours start by the time Flamininus had dismantled his camp and got under way. According to Polybius 'Flamininus, suspecting what was about to happen' (ὑποπτεύσας τὸ μέλλον) i.e., what Philip had in mind, began to put his army in motion at the same time as Philip, being eager himself to forestall Philip and destroy the crops in the territory of Scotussa'. Livy went one better: he said that 'both commanders aimed at Scotussa' (xxxiii 6.8).<sup>7</sup> The facts are otherwise. Flamininus covered some 15 km in what was left of the day and reached Eretria, far away from Scotussaeon territory<sup>8</sup> (see FIG. 2). On the other hand, Philip had no difficulty in covering the 20 km of easy going to his objective, the outskirts of Scotussa town, from which he could draw foodstuffs that evening. There he encamped by the adjacent river, the Platanorrema, being Polybius' river Onchestus (xviii 20.5) no doubt so that his horses could be watered and pastured.<sup>9</sup> Neither commander knew where the other was; for the Karadag range lay between them, and the camps were some 12 km apart as the crow flies.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> If Flamininus had advanced through the gap by Pherae and headed north, Philip would have returned to make contact with Demetrias and Thebes; and he would then have occupied the Pherae gap and cut Flamininus' line of supplies.

<sup>7</sup> Livy at xxxiii 6.3 distorted Polybius' account by saying that Philip, being near Larissa, had been informed that Flamininus had moved from Phthiotic Thebes to Pherae. For Polybius said at xviii 19.3 that Philip heard of Flamininus being encamped round Thebes.

<sup>8</sup> Eretria—by the village now called Eretria (previously Tsangli)—has been described by Pritchett 140 and by I. Blum in *AAA* xv (1982) 159 ff.

<sup>9</sup> See the discussion by Walbank 576, who summarises earlier views. Kromayer, riding in April from near Pherae to Scotussa, found Pritchett's river Onchestus dry and judged the Platanorrema by Ayia Triadha the only watercourse worthy of the name in the region (his p. 68).

<sup>10</sup> The lack of reconnaissance is surprising, as indeed in the approach of each army to the Pherae gap; but it is incomprehensible if Flamininus really intended to invade Scotussaeon territory on the other side of the Karadag range.

At the end of the second day Flamininus encamped *περὶ τὸ Θετίδειον* (Plb. xviii 20.6). In LSJ<sup>9</sup> the primary meaning of *περὶ* with the accusative is 'round', which is suitable if τὸ Θετίδειον was a shrine or a small *temenos*. The second meaning is looser, 'around' or 'by', which is appropriate in connection with a city or a region, as at xviii 19.3 *στρατοπεδεύειν περὶ τὸς Θήβας*. The first meaning is preferable here, because there are grounds, as we shall see, for regarding the Thetideum as the holy place of the marriage of Thetis and Peleus. On the other hand, Thetideum can hardly be a city in 197. Had it been, our battle and that of 367 BC would have been named *περὶ τὸ Θετίδειον* and not *περὶ τὰς Κυνὸς Κεφαλὰς*, as at xviii 28.1; moreover, it would have been destroyed by Philip and mentioned by Livy in the company of Palaepharsalus nearby, Euhydrium, Iresiae and Eretria (xxxii 13.9).

'The Thetideum' was in the territory of Pharsalus (xviii 20.6), which was divided lengthwise by the river Enipeus.<sup>11</sup> Flamininus preferred to occupy a position north rather than south of the river. He would then place himself between Philip and Philip's garrison at Pharsalus, he would be able to intercept Philip if he should try to emerge from the Karadag range, and he would be in command of the crossing of the Enipeus river. On the other hand, if he stayed south of the river, he could contain the Macedonian garrison of Pharsalus and secure his line of supply from Xyniae through western Thessaly; and that line might be necessary, if the Macedonian troops in Thebes and Demetrias were to threaten his present line of supply via the Eretria gap from coastal southeast Thessaly. His preference for a position north of the river was due to his wish to force an engagement on favourable ground.

In order to reach the plain north of the crossing he had to march some 20 km, which was reasonable for an army of some 30,000 men, and once there he had to find a position for a fortifiable camp and a place with plenty of good drinking water for his men, his horses and his elephants. I concluded therefore that he would avoid the open plain, which was favourable to the Macedonian phalanx, and would choose a site on the edge of the foothills which had plenty of water. When I studied the British Staff Map 1:100,000, the best site seemed to be Ayioi Anaryiroi on that map. My reconnaissance in October 1985 began with that tentative assumption. By then I knew the correct name of the village: Zoodokhos Pege, 'Lifegiving Spring', which was encouraging in the matter of water-supply (see FIG. 2).

On his second day Philip probably started late from Scotussa. He had to load his wagons with foodstuffs, and once on the way he probably let his horses feed on the standing cereals (which grow mostly west of Scotussa),<sup>12</sup> and his grooms collected fodder for the future. He needed water for his next camp. A march of 12 km would have taken him to Khalkiadhēs, a village which was said by Stählin to have springs of water—a rare thing in that area. This then might be 'Melambium in the territory of Scotussa' (Plb. xviii 20.6). Neither commander knew where the other was; for the ridge of Karadag lay between Khalkiadhēs and Zoodokhos Pege. It was at the crossing of that ridge that the battle began on the third day. My reconnaissance therefore included that ridge.

Before we turn to the reconnaissance, we may deal with two problems: the size of the Roman army and the date of the battle. Philip's army is not in doubt. Livy xxxiii 4.4–5, drawing on Polybius, gave him 16,000 phalangites, 2,000 'Peltasts' being élite guardsmen, 2,000 Thracians, 2,000 Illyrians called Tralles, 1,500 mercenaries of varied nationalities and 2,000 cavalry, totalling 25,500, which agrees with the total in Plu. *Flam.* 7.3, where the forces of Philip were said to be similar to those of Flamininus, the latter being according to Plutarch over 26,000. Livy says that the Roman army was 'almost the same in number' as the Macedonian army, but that it was superior in cavalry thanks to the accession of the Aetolian cavalry. This, then, was

<sup>11</sup> This territory extended eastwards probably to the narrows by Dasolophos and Ambelia.

<sup>12</sup> Kromayer 67 f. and Stählin, *RE* s.v. 'Skotoussa', 614.

what Polybius reported. Was he correct? Since Flamininus had 2,000 'hastati' at Thebes (Livy xxxiii 1.2), his legions were evidently at full strength. The legionaries, then, on the reckoning of Kromayer 103, numbered 22,000. Plutarch, *loc. cit.*, said that the Aetolians sent 400 cavalry and 6,000 infantry. The MSS of Livy xxxiii 3.9 give 400 cavalry and 600 infantry. It is better to accept Plutarch's figure for the infantry and to reject Livy's as due either to an error by him or to corruption of the text in transmission; for the Aetolian claim to have played a major part in the victory and the provision of 1,200 infantry by the Athamanes, a much smaller people, argue in favour of 6,000 Aetolian infantry. There were also 800 Cretan infantry. The Romans then had 30,000 infantry in all and some 2,400 cavalry, yielding a total of 32,000 men. This is a probable and not a certain conclusion.<sup>13</sup>

The date of the battle is not important in itself. But Kromayer's chronology of events has Flamininus sit inactive at Xyniae for as much as two weeks to a month.<sup>14</sup> This is inexplicable in a general of Flamininus' drive, is a very costly and pointless delay, and is not compatible with Livy's words at xxxiii 3.9: *nihil morati Aetoli sunt*. It is therefore desirable to look at the evidence afresh. Livy mentioned that Flamininus sent for Attalus 'at the beginning of spring' and brought him from Cenchreae to Elatea in Phocis. As Attalus was an infirm old man (xxxiii 2.2), we may allow a fortnight for the summoning and fetching, so that Attalus arrived about the end of March.<sup>15</sup> The expedition to Thebes, the negotiations, the collapse of Attalus, the delay of Flamininus until he saw Attalus out of danger and the return to Elatea might have taken another fortnight. 'Almost about that time' Philip was at Dium (xxxiii 3.5-6). Flamininus then led his army to Heraclea (some 40 km in two days), fixed the quota of Aetolian troops the next day and reached Xyniae 'on the third day', say on 21 April. The Aetolian contingent 'delayed not at all' (xxxiii 3.9). When they joined him, he was quick to break camp and head for Phthiotic Thebes, 50 km from Xyniae as the crow flies. He presented himself near the walls early on perhaps the 25th. On that morning we may assume that Philip was alerted, and by the evening of the 26th he made his camp north of Pherae. Flamininus advanced slowly and made his camp on the evening of the 26th south of Pherae (see FIG. 1).

After two days both armies moved off, and three days later the battle took place, i.e., on May 1st or soon afterwards, as our calculations are only approximate. At that time the crops were green; for the harvest normally occupies the middle of June in central Thessaly.<sup>16</sup> Livy's statement that the victories won by Rome made the celebration of the Roman Games more joyful, i.e., in mid-June 197 BC, merely gives us a *terminus ante quem*. There is one rogue statement by Livy which will not fit any reconstruction; for he said at xxxiii 24.3 that the despatch reporting the victory was read in the Senate 'almost at the end of the year', i.e., in the autumn.<sup>17</sup>

Palaepharsalus used to be located at Palaiokastros, some 9 km east of Pharsalus, but excavation showed that the site was not inhabited after c. 500 BC. In 1983 J. D. Morgan demonstrated in an important article that Palaepharsalus was at Krene, and that it lay on the

<sup>13</sup> Kromayer 103 n. 3 and Pritchett 135 accepted Livy's figure of 500 for the Aetolian infantry as correct; they thereby reduced the total of Flamininus' forces, both Italian and Greek, to 27,000. F. W. Walbank followed Kromayer in his *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge 1940) 167, but he gave a total of 32,000 in his *Commentary*, p. 572.

<sup>14</sup> Kromayer 114 dated the battle to the end of May or beginning of June. He therefore postulated up to a month's delay (111); it was accepted by Walbank in his *Philip* 322, but less firmly in his *Commentary*, p. 579.

<sup>15</sup> Livy's statement is vague. He moves from winter to spring at xxxiii 1.1, and he does not make it clear with which phrase 'initio autem veris' is to be associated. As

we see from n. 3 above, he thought of spring beginning c. 14th March; he would hardly have asked Attalus to travel any earlier than that.

<sup>16</sup> Kromayer 111 'die Kornerernte fällt heutzutage in Thessalien um die Mitte des Juni'. If the crops had six weeks or so to ripen for harvesting, they would be good fodder for the cavalry mounts; but within, say, a month of harvesting they would be too rich and cause colic. I owe this information to a horseman, Corbett Capps of the National Humanities Center. Combine harvesting was completed by 18th June in 1986. Walbank 579 gave July as the harvest month.

<sup>17</sup> Kromayer 115 tries to explain the origin of Livy's mistake.

Roman road from Larissa via Crannon to Pharsalus, since it appeared in a corrupt form e.g. in *Cosm.* 4.9–10 ‘Granona—Palfari—Farsalos.’<sup>18</sup> The Thetideum was named after the marriage of Thetis and Peleus; for ‘Thetis of the sea lived there in wedlock with Peleus, apart, shunning the company of mankind’ (E. *Andr.* 17–20). Thus Euripides thought of the Thetideum as a holy place, uninhabited in mythical times. Later, in order to leave the kingdom clear for Peleus, Neoptolemus and Andromache lived there: in her words ‘I dwell in grassy plains bordering Phthia there and the Pharsalian town’ (16–17). ‘Phthia’ was probably Pharsalus (modern Pharsala), and ‘the Pharsalian town’ was probably Palaepharsalus at Krene. Strabo 441, perhaps having Euripides’ lines in mind, placed the Thetideum ‘near the Pharsali old and new’, i.e. between modern Pharsala and Krene. ‘Thetis of the sea’ so far inland should connote, in my opinion, a remarkable source of water, from which she appeared to her lover. She was worshipped in Thessaly also as a corn-goddess, and irrigation was always important for the crops.<sup>19</sup> I looked therefore for a place in the borderland, overlooking or in the plains and having a remarkable source of water. Zoodokhos Pege, ‘Lifegiving Spring’, was the obvious candidate for reconnaissance.

According to Zonaras iv 16 the opposing armies camped on either side of a ridge called Cynoscephale, ‘Dog-head’: πρὸς τινα λόφον γενόμενοι οὐ τὴν ἀκρωνυχίαν Κυνὸς κεφαλὴν ὀνομάζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἔνθεν οἱ δ’ ἐκεῖθεν ἠύλισαντο. The ensuing battle was around a place called Cynoscephalae, ‘Dog-heads’, according to Strabo 441: ἔστι δ’ ἐν τῇ Σκοτούσσει χωρίον τι Κυνὸς κεφαλαὶ καλούμενον. The difference between the singular and the plural becomes clear when we turn to Plu. *Flam.* 8.2: ἐμάχοντο περὶ τὰς καλουμένας Κυνὸς κεφαλὰς αἱ λόφων οὔσαι πυκνῶν καὶ παραλλήλων ἄκραι λεπταὶ δι’ ὁμοίότητα τοῦ σχήματος οὕτω ὠνομάσθησαν. ‘They fought around the so-called Dog-heads, which, being the slight tops of ridges close to and parallel to one another, are so named because of the similarity of the shape.’ Polybius xviii 22.10 described the same place thus: οἱ γὰρ προειρημένοι λόφοι καλοῦνται μὲν Κυνὸς κεφαλαί, τραχεῖς δ’ εἰσὶ καὶ περικεκλασμένοι καὶ πρὸς ὕψος ἰκανὸν ἀνατείνοντες. ‘The aforesaid ridges are called Dog-heads, and they are rough and broken and they attain a considerable height.’ Livy xxxiii 7.3 differed from Polybius in making Philip’s advanced troops come over the ridge and encamp on the Roman side of it. He remarked at xxxiii 7.5 that there were a number of ridges (he used ‘tumulus’ to translate λόφος), and at xxxiii 7.9 and 10.1 that the ridge occupied by the Macedonians as the mist cleared and then by Philip as the battle was ending was higher than the others (‘tumulum maxime editum inter alios’ and ‘tumulum altiore inter ceteros’). He may have taken these points from a source other than Polybius.

Plutarch mentioned both the Thetideum and the Dog-heads in describing the battle of 364 BC. Then Pelopidas came from the south to Pharsalus and Alexander came from Pherae towards the Thetideum. Pelopidas advanced and Alexander ‘went to the Thetideum to meet him’ (ἀπὴντα πρὸς τὸ Θετιδεῖον, Plu. *Pelop.* 32.1). There both were eager to gain possession of the ridges which ‘were sloping on all sides, were high, and ran in an opposite direction to the space between’ (i.e., between the two armies) ‘down the so-called Dog-heads’: ἀντιτεινόντων δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέσον κατὰ τὰς καλουμένας Κυνὸς κεφαλὰς λόφων περικλινῶν καὶ ὑψηλῶν. If we envisage the two hoplite formations in the plain, that of Alexander facing west and that of Pelopidas

<sup>18</sup> Morgan 23–54; he refers in n. 3 to Y. Béquignon’s excavation.

<sup>19</sup> Since Peleus was represented as ruling over both Phthia and Pharsalus (lines 22 and 731), the Thetideum had to be on the edge of their territories’ meeting place, that is not in the plains but somewhere overlooking the plains. J. D. Morgan has very kindly drawn my attention to the Scholia on E. *Andr.* 16–17, which, like

Strabo, place the Thetideum between these towns, ‘Phthia and the Pharsalian town.’ For the view that there was also a place or town called Thetideum, see F. Stählin in *RE* vi.i (1936) 205 f. s.v. ‘Thetideion’ ‘Tempel der Thetis und Ortschaft’. He gave the evidence for Thetis being also a corn-goddess in Thessaly. See also Walbank 579.

facing east, then the ridges apparently descended from the north by the Cynoscephalae and ran down, more or less at right-angles to the edge of the plain between the opposing armies.<sup>20</sup>

A glance at the map showed very clearly what these ridges might be and where they were to be found. For several ridges parallel and close to one another run down from Vlachostrata (with a highpoint of 340 m at Mezine Magoula), from highpoint 362 m, and from Veliourrakhe (300 m), all more or less at right angles to the edge of the plain. The highest (362 m) is above Khalkiadhēs, where I proposed to put the camp of Philip, and also above Zoodokhos Pege, where I proposed to put the camp of Flamininus. But maps never have the last word in such matters. The battlefield had to have special qualities: ground for a phalanx to charge, level ground for the phalanx almost to reach, lines of vision between points, ground suitable for elephants and so on. A reconnaissance was therefore required; and thanks to the generous hospitality of the National Hellenic Research Foundation I was able to carry it out.<sup>21</sup>

## 2. *The reconnaissance of the ground.*

We reached the village of Vasile on the afternoon of 26th October 1985. Situated on the higher bank of the river Enipeus, the village is safe from floods; and it is this bank downstream which carried a road, whereas the road on the north side has to keep to the edge of the foothills. We walked across a concrete runway through the bed of the river (at that time not running). It is evidently built where there is a ford in wet weather. Further upstream the riverbed is crossed by the main road bridge, which is built on several arches and is some 150 m long.<sup>22</sup> We were told by villagers that a piece of paved road (*plakostroto*) emerging from the river bed on the north side had been found recently at a point below the bridge and above the ford. The paving shows that it was part of an ancient and not a Turkish road.

After crossing the ford we noticed at some distance from the bed a dyke some 3 m high but no longer maintained. The lie of this dyke or flood bank, when entire, is marked on the Greek Staff Map 1 : 50,000. It begins a little above the ford, runs at some distance from the north bank, and ends just beyond Orfana. Before the dyke was built there must have been flooded areas which are now fields; this is shown by the name of some fields 'Mavrogeies', which indicates the black soil of a fen. We walked through a gap in the dyke to Dendrakia, a very small village on a low hill in the plain. An old man in the village remembered extensive floods which started a little below the bridge and covered a wide area downstream. He said he used to go with pack-animals or a cart from Dendrakia via Driskoli (now Krene) and Souletsi (now Kypareσσos) to Larissa in five hours; that, he said, was the main route to Larissa in his young days. There are a number of ancient cut blocks in the village, but we did not see any marble pieces.

A very long drought had just broken with twenty-four hours of rain on the previous day. The drought accounted for the river's not running. The air was misty, as we looked across the plain northwards to the two hamlets which make up Zoodokhos Pege. At 3.30 p.m. the sun was low. The sunlight showed up three or four conical, low hills, of which two were just behind the hamlets and a third was further to the west. These hills were certainly very marked features in that light, whether or not they could be called 'dog-heads', as Dr Hatzopoulos suggested they

<sup>20</sup> LSJ<sup>9</sup> s.v. 'ἀντί' C i gives the meaning of the compound as 'over against' which I take to be the opposite of 'alongside' or 'parallel to'. The πρὸς τὸ μεσόν shows in which direction the ridges were pointing. For κατὰ see Appendix I. We should retain ἀντιτείνόντων as the *lectio difficilior* and not emend to read ἀντατεινόντων. Plutarch used ἀντιτείνω for a precise geographical description at *Them.* 8.3.

<sup>21</sup> The Foundation elected me to a Fellowship for a month and the British Academy gave me a grant to

travel. I am most grateful to both. Dr M. B. Hatzopoulos and his son Philip accompanied my wife and me on the reconnaissance. Dr Hatzopoulos gave me much excellent advice on matters of topography and tactics.

<sup>22</sup> In 1835 Leake 472 described the river as 'often very formidable in winter and sometimes quite dry in summer'. Kromayer 118 wrote in 1907 of the only stone bridge in the area, that of Dendrakia. Where the river cut into the alluvium at bends, it created steep banks (Caesar, *B.C.* iii 88.6).

might be. Between Dendrakia and the main road we passed a large factory for the baling of cotton, which has outstripped wheat and maize as the main crop of this extremely fertile valley of rich alluvial soil.

Next morning at dawn we reached Ano Khalkiadhēs, an upper hamlet recently developed. A steady but not steep descent leads to the main village three quarters of a mile away. We walked up to the ridge. On the way I talked to a shepherd who was pasturing sixty sheep (see PLATE Ia). He told me that Khalkiadhēs has three springs still used for animals but the villagers have piped water, which comes from the water table under Vasile. One spring is in the lower village, and two are on the way to the upper hamlet. The name of the long ridge running to the west is Vlachostrata and another hilltop area is called Roumania; these names show that this was a large area of pasture used by Vlach shepherds before the advent of the tractor. Most of it is now ploughed land.

The highest point (362 m) is crowned by a large concrete water-tank. From beside the tank I had a commanding view of the ridgetops and of the slopes which run down towards the plain of the Enipeus valley. (See FIG. 3.) The watershed ridge runs east to west from Hill 362 to Hill 340 but on the way a spur curves southwestwards to a group of farm buildings, called Kremaste, which are on a slightly lower level (see PLATE Ib). A road from the lower hamlet of Khalkiadhēs runs just below the watershed ridge on its south side and ends at Kremaste. Six parallel ridges spring almost at right angles from the watershed ridge between the road from Pharsalus to Khalkiadhēs and Hill 304 of Krene. They descend gradually to the plain. We were concerned with the ridges emanating from Hill 362 and from the watershed ridge by Kremaste. As we walked along the road towards Kremaste, we looked down a steep slope to the head of the valley between these two ridges; and we noted a clump of trees there, which betrayed the presence of a spring (see PLATE Ic).

On the ridge north and northeast of Kremaste there are clumps of cypresses on two small rises. I walked a little to the west of the north end of Kremaste and looked down a steepish slope into a valley. This valley has a steady gradient and provides an easy route in the direction of Krene. I then returned to a level open space just north of the entry to the Kremaste farm. There we saw an isolated block, well cut, 1.18 × 1.18 × 0.43 m (see PLATE Id). It had lifting knobs on two adjacent sides. A third side had no knob, but on its top at the edge there was a rectangular slot for a clamp. The block was of smooth, hard grey limestone; and the positions of the knobs and the clamp showed that it had been part of a base, e.g., for a statue or *tropaion*. Two large blocks of the same stone were cemented to the outer wall of the first farm building. We could not explore inside, as the gate was locked.

The farm buildings stand on the broad, almost flat surface of the southwards-running ridge. We shall refer to this as the first flat area (FA I on FIG. 3). We passed the buildings and we walked south along a broad surface of ploughed soil with a very gentle downward slope (see PLATE IIa). The slope then increased but only to flatten on to a second flat area (see PLATE IIb). After this flat area the slope increased and we descended to a third flat area as long but less wide. The ridge ran from the end of the third flat area with a gradual declension towards the plain, which starts with the first houses of the western hamlet of Zoodokhos Pege (we were walking on the eastern slope of the ridge). As we came down from Kremaste onwards we had a clear view of the valley down to the plain and of the parallel ridge to the east, which is similar in shape but dips before it rises again and ends in Hill 260, which has small pine trees on its top (see PLATES Ie, IIc). Hill 260 is one of the hills we had seen from Dendrakia. If one started from Zoodokhos Pege and wanted to follow the eastern ridge, one would walk up the valley bottom and branch off at the dip north of Hill 260 (see FIG. 3).

As we came towards the foot of the western ridge, I turned off and climbed up the slope of the ridge in order to obtain a view, and on looking back I saw in the low rays of the morning sun the unmistakable outline of a Roman camp on the opposite slope, just below the wall of the




FIG. 3. The Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC

Key:

- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| DM    | Detachment of maniples  |
| FA    | Flat Area   |
| K     | Kremaste  |
| L+E   | One legion and elephants  |
| RC    | Complete Roman Camp   |
| RP    | Roman parade of 2 legions and elephants                                 |
| S     | Spring  |
| Θ     | Thetideum (Sanctuary of Thetis)   |
| × × × | Limit of the advance by the Macedonian reinforcements (Plb. xviii 22.6) |
| ----- | Seasonal streams  |

cemetery and above a concrete cap over a spring in the valley bottom (see PLATE II*d*). The gateway of the camp faced west towards this spring. A built fountain was visible at the mouth of the valley. The camp was roughly rectangular with rounded corners, a ditch and a vallum; the west side measured 97 paces, the north side 66 paces, the east side 81 paces and the south side 80 paces. It was on a gentle slope from the east down to the west. A ramp ran along the west side at a little distance from the ditch. On the lower side of the ramp there was the angle of another camp, which had probably been of a similar size, as it would then have fitted well into the space between the first camp and the track along the valley bottom. From both camps one had an uninterrupted view of the ridge down which we had come and also of the watershed ridge between Hill 362 and Kremaste (see PLATES I*e*, I*f*).

I then walked round the shoulder of Hill 260 to a trigonometrical column on a high point. From there I saw the smooth and easy ascent from the dip on to the eastward ridge. We then walked into the village. The villager we talked to did not know of the camp; this is understandable, as the slope is normally covered with tall thistles and plants. They were dry and withered in October. As we left by taxi for Pharsalus, we saw a magnificent gushing spring with an Arabic inscription on the fountain building, situated on the southeast side of Hill 260 and higher than the road.

To summarise, the watershed ridge is part of the high ground which still provides hill pastures. It did so on a much larger scale before the day of the tractor. In 197 BC the tops and slopes of the ridges would have been grassed for grazing. The high ground is likely to have belonged to Scotussa and its villages or farmsteads (such as Melambium, which I take to have been at Khalkiadhēs) rather than to a village at the edge of the plain (such as Zoodokhos Pege). The watershed ridge, then, was as Strabo had it ἐν τῇ Σκοτούσσει, and the camps were on either side of the 'ridge of which the ridge-top was called Cynoscephale' (Zonar. 9.16) πρὸς τινὰ λόφον γενόμενοι, οὗ τὴν ἀκρωνυχίαν Κυνὸς κεφαλὴν ὀνομάζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἔνθεν οἱ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἠύλισαντο). The highlands of the watershed ridge are αἱ ὑπερβολαί. They include the slight tops ἄκραι λεπταί, called οἱ ἄκροι by Polybius; and the part between Hill 362 and Kremaste was probably ἡ ὑπερβολή (xviii 24.3) (see PLATES I*d* and I*f*).

If Philip's camp was at lower Khalkiadhēs, there was a direct and quite easy ascent to the watershed ridge (see PLATE I*a*): but if one wanted to go from the camp to Krene or to the road above Krene, there was no need to go to the ridge-top by Kremaste; it was easier to go round it on the western side and take the easy route which I had seen west of Kremaste. This is apparently what Philip tried to do when the mist was thick, that is if we keep close to the manuscripts' περιεῖη and περιηεῖ and read περιηεῖ, 'he was trying to go round' (xviii 20.8).

The magnificent springs at Zoodokhos Pege provided just what Flamininus needed, and the obvious site for a fortified camp was by Hill 260. The Thetideum was evidently a sacred area with an altar for Andromache on Hill 260, probably by a spring, and Flamininus encamped his two legions, the supporting troops and the elephants 'round the Thetideum'. He hoped to intercept the Macedonian army the next day. If he was correct in his belief that Philip was aiming to position his army at or near Palaepharsalus (Krene), he might well do so. Though he was unaware of it, he was less than four kilometres from his enemy's camp, and he was only two kilometres from the ridge of Cynoscephale, where the rival forces were to clash at dawn next day.

A further reconnaissance was carried out on 20 and 21 June 1986. Pharsalus was a very large fortified city. From the entry to the acropolis we saw in the evening sun the stand of cypresses on the knoll above Kremaste. The morning of the 21st was hazy and very hot. Proceeding to Krene, we saw well-cut masonry probably from an ancient shrine in the old built-fountain below the main church. The shrine on the hill above the church is probably on an ancient holy place. Five inscribed stelai from ancient cemeteries here have been published.<sup>23</sup> A. S. Tziaphalias thought

<sup>23</sup> W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften aus Thessalien* (Heidelberg 1975) 7; and A. S. Tziaphalias in *Arch. Delt.* xxx (1975) [1983] B 1 *Chron.* 196 f.

that the ancient city was on the low hill north of the modern village; and J. D. Morgan found many sherds of Classical, Hellenistic and Roman times on the south side of Hill 325, which lies east of the village. It was evidently a large and important place in Hellenistic times.

Walking from Krene to Zoodokhos Pege we saw five herds of sheep on the lowest slopes and gleaning in the fields; for combine harvesting had been completed by 18th June, as we learnt by inquiry. We saw that the march from just west of Kremaste to just south of Hill 325 would be over easy, undulating ground. Turning up the valley immediately west of the first houses of Zoodokhos Pege we had easy going to a now disused long water-trough, fed by a spring, and noted the steeper rise of the ridge leading to Kremaste (see FIG. 3). We then went east to view the Roman camp from the ridge-top. This time I noticed three parallel lines of levelled (or at least altered) ground, running from the top side of the camp to the edge of the wood. On inspection these lines continued into the wood. They might have been vestiges of other camps or of later earthworks. The highest (just below the electric transformer) ran for 45 paces into the wood and then swung northeastwards for 33 paces. The next highest, some 60 paces distant from the first, ran for some 70 paces into the wood. The third, being some 30 paces distant from the second, ran into the wood and then curved southeastwards. Below this last line by the cypress in PLATE II*d* there is the earliest church, in ruins, having the cemetery to the west and the highest water-point (now encased for irrigation) to the east. This high water-point presumably was adjacent to the shrine of Thetis and then to the Christian church.

Between the ruined church and the two later churches there is quite a large area which has been terraced and levelled to provide arable fields. If there were camps on that area, as we should expect, no trace is left. I noted a large well-shaped block of limestone, its surface some  $2\frac{1}{2} \times 2\frac{1}{2}$  feet, which had one roughly-chiselled face, indicating that the block had been part of a monumental base. We did not see any indication of an ancient settlement in Hellenistic times at Zoodokhos Pege. But then we visited only a small area.

### 3. *The Battle of Cynoscephalae* (see FIG. 3).

'Before dawn the clouds came down in mist, so that one could not make out a man in front of one in the gloom. Nevertheless in his eagerness to complete the journey to his destination Philip broke camp and tried to go round with his entire army. But being in difficulty on the march because of the mist, he covered only a little distance; then he put the main army into camp and sent off the reconnoitring force with instructions to go straight to the tops of the intervening hills' (i.e., of the hills between Philip and his destination).

Thus Polybius began his account at xviii 20.7. Livy added confused shouts, and he misconceived the situation by bringing the whole Macedonian army across the watershed ridge, in his words 'supergressi tumulos qui Cynoscephalae vocantur' (Plb. xviii 20.7-9 and Livy xxxiii 7.1-3). Plutarch followed an account not by Polybius but by a Greek writer, who wrote of the mist in the plain, saw Flamininus as eager to win the praise of the Greeks and tended to ridicule the Aetolians. Thus Plutarch mentioned in his account a speech by each commander on the day before the mist came down. But all he said about Philip was that he unwittingly went to the top of a mound which was in fact a burial mound (*polyandrion*) in order to address the troops, and that he was so shattered by the dreadful omen that he stayed put that day (*Flam.* 7.4-7). The veracity of this detail is uncertain;<sup>24</sup> but the description of the mist covering all the plain is impressive (8.1).

Polybius turns now to Flamininus. 'Encamped round the Thetideum and at a loss as to the whereabouts of the enemy, he sent off 300 cavalry and up to 1,000 light-armed infantry to go over the ground in a careful reconnaissance.' In the mist they encountered the Macedonian force, were worsted by it and sent to their camp for help. Flamininus sent 500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, and they in turn drove the Macedonians back towards the tops. Now the Macedonians sent to their camp for help (xviii 21).

<sup>24</sup> That there was a tumulus, said to be the burial-place of Amazons, 'in Scotussaean territory and by the Cynoscephalae' is known from Plu. *Theseus* 27 fin.

What is uncertain is whether Philip mounted such a tumulus to address his men.

Livy xxxiii 7–8 adds some colour, omits the names of Aetolian officers mentioned by Polybius, and makes the reinforcement of 2,500 ‘mostly Aetolian.’<sup>25</sup> Plutarch, *Flam.* 8.2–3, condenses the action but describes the Cynoscephalae ridges as they were seen from the Roman camp or the plain.

Polybius turns next to Philip. ‘As he had never expected a general engagement on that day for the reasons already mentioned, it happened that he had even let a considerable number of men go from the camp to collect fodder. On learning then from the messengers what was happening, with the mist already clearing, he sent the Thessalian cavalry, a Macedonian hipparchy, and all the mercenaries except the Thracians. They pressed hard on the enemy and in their turn began to drive the Romans from the tops for a change. What mainly prevented them from routing the enemy completely was the spirit of the Aetolian cavalrymen; for they fought quite passionately and recklessly.’ (I omit his comparison of Aetolian cavalry and Aetolian infantry at xviii 22.5.) ‘So then the Aetolian cavalry held up the attack of the enemy, and the Romans were no longer driven right on to the level ground,<sup>26</sup> but at a short distance from it stood firm in their turn.’ Livy xxxiii 7.8–13 has the actions correct except that he brings the Romans ‘on to the more level valley’ (12, ‘in planiorem vallem perventum est’), which is probably due to his misreading of Polybius. But he adds two points which are not in Polybius: that Philip sent a large part of his men of every kind to forage (this is probably correct, because later on the phalangites came up in dribs and drabs), and that with the mist clearing Philip saw his Macedonians crowded together on the highest of a number of hills (9, ‘in tumulum maxime editum inter alios compulsi’). Livy may have made the additions from another source to enliven the narrative. Plutarch, *Flam.* 8.3, is very brief.

Polybius now gives the effect of this on the two commanders. ‘Flamininus not only saw that his light-armed infantry and his cavalry had given way, but he also realised that his whole army was alarmed; so he began to lead all the army out and drew it up close to the hills (xviii 22.7 πρὸς τοῖς βουνοῖς). At the same time messenger after messenger came running from the Macedonian reconnoitring force to Philip, shouting “Your Majesty, the enemy are on the run; do not lose the opportunity; the barbarians will not stand up to us; now is your day, now your moment.” So that Philip was challenged to engage, although he did not approve of the terrain.’ (The description of the Cynoscephalae ridges follows, which we have already mentioned.) ‘On that account as he foresaw the unsuitability of the ground, he was originally not at all disposed to fight; but then, encouraged by the overoptimistic reports, he was giving the order to bring the army out of the camp. But Flamininus, having drawn up his entire army in formation, was sending help to his men in action and at the same time he was giving encouragement as he went up and down the ranks.’ (Polybius then gives a short but stirring speech.) ‘After this speech he was ordering the right-hand part to stand firm with the elephants in front, and he was advancing in earnest with the left-hand part and the light-armed against the enemy. And the men in action on receiving reinforcement of the regular infantry (i.e., legionary soldiers) in their turn pressed their opponents hard. At the same time, when Philip saw the greater part of his own regular force (i.e., the phalanx and the Peltasts) already in formation in front of his camp, he took the Peltasts and the right-hand part of the phalanx and was leading them on, making the direct ascent to the ridges, and he instructed Nicanor, nicknamed “Jumbo”, to see to it that the remainder of the regular force should follow at speed. As soon as the leading men (i.e., in column) reached the ridge-top (τῆς ὑπερβολῆς), he deployed them into line on the left and gained possession first of the commanding ground. For the tops were not occupied, because the Macedonians in action had pressed the Romans a long way to the other side of the hills’ (xviii 22.7–24.3).

Livy again adds some enlivening touches, especially on Philip’s unwillingness to engage, has the Romans in retreat ‘at the bottom of the valley’ (xxxiii 8.6 ‘in ima valle’), and makes Philip come up hill at the double<sup>27</sup> (8.8). Plutarch omits this stage of the action. Polybius continues as follows:

‘As Philip was still deploying the right hand sections of his army, the mercenaries arrived, heavily pressed by the enemy; for when the heavy-armed Romans joined the light-armed Romans, as I said just now, and shared in the action, they turned the scales as it were, pressed the enemy hard and were killing many of them. When the king came up, at the beginning, and saw the action of his light-armed concentrated not far from the enemy camp, he was overjoyed; but when he saw his own men again in

<sup>25</sup> This suggests that Livy forgot his reduction of the Aetolians from 6,000 to 600 infantrymen, or that his text originally had 6,000 infantrymen.

<sup>26</sup> The expression εἰς τοὺς ἐπιπέδους τόπους is not

the same as εἰς τὸ πεδῖον which occurs in Plu. *Pel.* 32.

<sup>27</sup> A picturesque touch but unlikely, when a man was carrying his pike; for Polybius mentioned the burdensomeness of a pike on the march at xviii 18.3.

their turn giving way and in need of support, he was compelled to help and to decide the whole issue on the spur of the moment, although most of the sections of the phalanx were still on the march and ascending the hills.'

Livy xxxiii 8.9–11 adds local colour such as corpses and discarded weapons, and then makes Philip hesitate and dither until he can no longer safely withdraw. Plutarch has nothing on this phase.

It is desirable now to fix the scene of the action so far on the map (see FIG. 3). If the first camp of Philip was at the lower end of Khalkiadhēs village, and if he aimed to 'go around' (reading περιήει) i.e., to the west of the high part of the ridge north of Kremaste, his second camp was only a short distance uphill to the southwest of the first camp. The troops sent ahead occupied the tops of the intervening hills, i.e., Hill 362, two knolls north of Kremaste, and perhaps Hill 340. The camp of Flamininus 'round the Thetideum' was also in thick mist, and his reconnoitring troops were probably taken by local guides on the easiest route, i.e., up the ridge to Kremaste and beyond it onto the watershed ridge. Here the action developed. The Romans were defeated. When they were reinforced, the Macedonian troops retired to the tops, i.e., to the knolls above Kremaste and some to Hill 362 (see PLATE IIa). In their turn the Romans were driven from the heights by Macedonian reinforcements and were forced back down the long Kremaste ridge but not quite on to what I have described as the third flat area (see FIG. 3 and PLATES If, IIa, IIb).

It was this part of the action which the king saw when he first arrived on the watershed ridge just above Kremaste, since he had taken the direct route from the camp to where he knew the fighting was. He was overjoyed, because the action then was 'not far from the enemy camp'; if it stayed there, his phalanx could form on a flat area of the ridge and charge on to the third flat area. As his column of men marched on to the flat area just above Kremaste, he deployed into line to his left (see PLATE Ib). Meanwhile Flamininus did two things: first, he sent some legionaries to reinforce his men who, he saw, were in difficulties, and second, he paraded all other troops 'close to the hills', that was on the ground a little to the north of his camp where the valley bottom had easy access to both ridges (see PLATE IIc). From the ridge above Kremaste and from Kremaste itself the lines of vision were clear to the scene of the action and to the Roman camp (see PLATES Ie, If); and equally Flamininus could see the action, the Kremaste top and the watershed ridge-top from his position (see FIG. 3).

Philip was still deploying his men into line as they arrived, when his defeated cavalry and light-armed came back. 'He received them still in action, placed them all on his right wing, ordered the Peltasts and the phalangites to double the depth of the formation<sup>28</sup> and close up to their right. That done, and the enemy being at hand, the order was given to the phalangites to lower their pikes and charge, and to the light-armed to hold the wing. At the same time too Flamininus, having taken his advanced troops into the spaces between the maniples, attacked the enemy.' (I omit the war-cries and apprehension.) 'Philip's right came off brilliantly in the engagement, because it was making its attack from higher ground, was superior in the weight of its formation and was much better off with its special armament for the particular situation. But the other sections of the regular army were some of them, though in contact

<sup>28</sup> Whether 'the right-hand part of the phalanx' meant 8,000 phalangites or fewer is not clear. In addition Philip had his 2,000 Peltasts. If he had 10,000 altogether, he formed them at first 16 men deep and then 32 men deep, which would have given him a front of 300 metres width for the charge downhill. It is probable that the right-hand part of the phalanx meant something like 5,000 phalangites, in which case the front was of some 220 metres. At xviii 30.1 Polybius described what was evidently a normal charge; his phalanx then was 16 men deep. At Cynoscephalae this formation was doubled in depth, i.e., to 32 men deep. This weight of men gave an additional impetus at the

moment of impact (xviii 25.2 τῷ βάρει τῆς συντάξεως and 30.4 αὐτῷ γε μὴν τῷ τοῦ σώματος βάρει). In making his analysis of the Macedonian phalanx Polybius was thinking not of this battle but of the battle of Pydna, when two battle-lines did engage in an orthodox manner. See my article in *JHS* civ (1984) 42 for 'the double phalanx', then of 32 men. Kromayer 81 n. 1 and Walbank 582 put the single phalanx at 8 men and the double phalanx at 16 men; but at xviii 30.1 Polybius was writing of a normal phalanx formation and not of a double phalanx. See also Plu. *Flam.* 8.4–5. Kromayer is inconsistent; for at 323 with n. 1 he made the double phalanx at Pydna one of 32 men.

with their own men in action, at a distance from the enemy, and others to their left, having just made the ridge-top, were visible on their heights (see PLATE IIa). When Flaminius saw that his men could not withstand the charge of the phalanx and that those of his left-hand part were being pressed back, indeed that some were already killed and others were retreating step by step, and that it was with the right-hand sections that his hopes of safety lay, he quickly dashed to them, and placing his elephants in front led the maniples against the enemy; for he saw at a glance that of the enemy a part was in touch with those in action, a part was just descending from the heights and a part was still standing on the heights (see PLATES If and IIa). As the Macedonians had no one to issue orders and could not form up and adopt the special formation of the phalanx, because the ground was difficult and because in following after those in action they were in marching order and not in battle-line, they did not even await the Romans coming to grips, but gave way, terrified and scattered by the elephants themselves.'

Livy xxxiii 8.12–9.7 follows Polybius closely, adding a trumpet-blast and a snide comment on the disordered part of the phalanx; and he misunderstands the Greek text in saying that the phalangites discarded (instead of lowered) their pikes. Plutarch, *Flam.* 8.4–5, gives a selective paraphrase of Polybius' narrative. His description helps us to see that Flaminius was attacking the Macedonians both in the valley bottom and on the upper part of the eastward ridge which leads to Hill 362. This includes the steep descent which we saw from the road as we walked towards Kremaste (see PLATES Ic, If, IIc).

Polybius continues with the victorious Romans. 'Most of the Romans were in pursuit, killing them. But one of the military tribunes with them, taking no more than twenty maniples and understanding what should be done at the critical moment, contributed greatly to the success of the whole. For seeing that the Macedonians with Philip had advanced far ahead of the others and were pressing the Roman left with their weight (by now on Flat Area 3), he broke off from those who were clearly victorious already on the right, and wheeling his force towards the continuing action he came up behind the Macedonians and began to attack them from the rear. And because the phalanx in action is constitutionally unable to reverse direction and fight man to man, he fell upon them, killing those in front of him, for they were unable to help themselves, until the time came when the Macedonians were compelled to throw away their weapons and take to flight, being attacked at the same time by those who had given way before their frontal charge and now turned to face them. At the beginning, as has just been said, Philip had been convinced that he was winning completely, judging by the part of the army with himself; but then when he saw at a glance that the Macedonians were suddenly throwing away their weapons and that the enemy had attacked from behind, he withdrew a little from the action with a few cavalrymen and infantrymen and was observing the whole situation. On noticing that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already coming close to the heights, he collected as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment and took to flight. While Flaminius was pursuing those in flight, he caught on the ridge-top the left-hand units of the Macedonians which were just heading for the heights. At first . . . he halted, when the enemy held their pikes upright, as is the Macedonians' custom whenever they surrender or go over to the opposing side. Afterwards on learning the significance of the action, he held his men back, deciding to spare those who had played the coward.<sup>29</sup> But just as he was pondering this, some of those in advance fell upon them and attacked them from above and killed the most of them, so that only a few escaped by throwing their weapons away.'

Livy xxxiii 9.8–10.5 has more to say than Polybius about the turning move by the military tribune, which he says was 'brevi circuitu', and about the nature of the ground. I quote the translation of E. T. Sage from the Loeb edition. 'The Macedonians were at a disadvantage too because of their position, since the ridge from which they had been fighting, when they were pursuing the soldiers who had been driven down the hill, had been given up to the enemy who had been led around behind them' (see FIG. 3). It is probable that Livy had before him a sentence in Polybius which has fallen out of our text in transmission. For it is precise; it describes exactly how the tribune moved (i.e., left across the valley bottom) on to the westward ridge at a point above the current position of the victorious Macedonians, who were on what I have called Flat Area 3 (see PLATES If, IIc). He and his men now had the advantage of the slope as they attacked the Macedonians from behind. Plutarch, *Flam.* 8.6–7, comments on the nature and weakness of

<sup>29</sup> The Romans must have been perfectly aware of this convention after many years of campaigning with and against the Macedonians. As at Pydna, the Roman

commander wanted a battle of extermination for as long as there was action.

the phalanx formation and goes on to the final stage, some Romans pursuing those in flight and others making a sortie from the flank and killing those Macedonians who were still fighting. Soon even those who were winning scattered and fled, laying down their weapons. Polybius and Plutarch give the numbers of Macedonians killed as 8,000 and captured as 5,000, and Polybius puts the Roman losses at 700. Livy says that he has followed Polybius in giving these numbers, whereas Valerius Antias and Claudius had much higher figures.

For the movement of his army and for the divining of his enemy's plans all the credit goes to Flamininus in this campaign. He anticipated Philip in reaching the position south of Pherae, he guessed the intention of Philip to reach the vicinity of Palaepharsalus and he chose an excellent site for his camp. From then on chance played a major part. But for the mist Philip would have outdistanced Flamininus and reached a suitable position either at Palaepharsalus or on the road just north of Palaepharsalus. Once there, he would have been better placed for supply than Flamininus. However, the mist deprived him of the lead. If contact between the advanced forces had happened earlier, Philip would not have committed his fatal error, the sending out of many men to collect fodder. His decision to engage with only part of his force at hand was lamentable. Even so, he might have won but for the brilliant initiative of the military tribune. When one walks over the scene of the battle, one realises how close-run the outcome of the battle was.

#### 4. *Some criticisms of earlier interpretations of the campaign of 197 BC*

The only full study is that of J. Kromayer in *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland* ii (Berlin 1907) 57–85 and later sections. He had little or nothing to say about supply and water points throughout the campaign. He believed that in advancing south of Tempe Philip was seeking a decisive engagement with the enemy. This was not borne out by Philip's actions. The text which Kromayer cites is Livy xxxiii 6.3, where Philip, having been informed that 'the Romans had moved from Thebes to Pherae', advanced to just north of Pherae 'desiring to have done with it as soon as possible by a set battle, he too' (*defungi quam primum et ipse certamine cupiens*). But Livy is a broken reed. He has mistranslated Polybius, his source, who said that Philip was informed of 'the Romans camping by Thebes'. The attribution of such a desire to Philip is a speculation by Livy; and with Livy's scenario it is disproved by Philip's evasion of a set engagement.

Kromayer (63) claimed that Philip meant to provision his army 'in the fruitful wheatland of Scotussa'. This mistranslated Polybius xviii 2, who had him seek provisions 'from that city',<sup>30</sup> and it led on to the mistaken belief that the wheat was ripe for harvesting, the battle was accordingly fought at the end of May or beginning of June (114, despite the harvest-dates cited in 112), and the Roman army must have sat inactive at Xyniae for a long time (110 'ein längerer Aufenthalt'); indeed, in order to arrive at Scotussa so late, for as much as a month (111). As we argued above (p. 66), this is unacceptable.

Kromayer (63) had Flamininus go into the territory of Scotussa 'at once' (*ungesäumt*) in order to spoil the standing wheat and hinder foraging by Philip. This cannot be so; for in Polybius' account, which Kromayer seems to follow, Flamininus went on the first day to Eretria and on the second day to the Thetideum 'in the territory of Pharsalus' (Plb. xviii 20.6). Such a route did not bring him into the territory of Scotussa at all (see FIG. 2). Kromayer went wrong in accepting as correct Polybius' statement that Flamininus set off from his camp south of Pherae 'intending to destroy the wheat in Scotussaeen territory beforehand', i.e. before Philip could get it. As we explained above (pp. 63–4), this statement was an attempt to give to Flamininus a specific purpose rather than make the admission that he was following on after the initiative taken by Philip.

Basing himself on these (it seems to me) false deductions, Kromayer had Flamininus strike northwards from Eretria into Scotussaeen territory with the aim of reaching Scotussa. Meanwhile he held Philip for the second day near Scotussa foraging.<sup>31</sup> Then at dawn on the

<sup>30</sup> Leake 458 was accurate in his translation.

<sup>31</sup> Kromayer 72 'damit ging der Tag hin.'

third day, according to Kromayer, Philip headed for the plain of Pharsalus (71), and Flamininus was in camp at the place called today Thetideion, some 3 km from Scotussa (why then was the ancient Thetideum said to be in 'the territory of Pharsalus and near Pharsalus and Palaepharsalus?'). The clash between the two armies developed at the hills called Mezil Magoula. When one looks at his map of the terrain (Karte no. 4), it seems impossible to fit the detailed account of Polybius at all precisely to the topography.

W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in ancient Greek topography* ii (Berkeley 1969), like F. Stählin,<sup>32</sup> rejected Kromayer's location of the battle. He travelled across the country by car (133) and found the ground less than suitable for his vehicle between Mikron Perivolakion and Ayia Triadha (see FIG. 2). However, a Macedonian army on the march did not move like a saloon car; and neither Leake nor Kromayer on horseback reported any difficulty at all. Pritchett had Philip march at a snail's pace—10 km on the first day and 6 km on the second day—and fail even to reach Scotussa, where Philip had intended to obtain supplies (Plb. xviii 20.2).<sup>33</sup> As a result of this lamentable performance Philip's advance party reached the Mavrorrakhes hills, less than 2 km from ancient Scotussa, on the dawn of the third day. Meanwhile Pritchett had Flamininus make his camp on the second day at Ayios Athanasios, which he identified with the Thetideum (it is difficult, when we look at his map, to see why it was said to be in the territory of Pharsalus, rather than in the territory of Scotussa). The battle developed on Pritchett's interpretation on the Mavrorrakhes some 6 km from his Thetideum at Ayios Athanasios. Pritchett makes no attempt to relate the terrain of the Mavrorrakhes and the 'Karamatlis rhevma' (141) to the detailed account of the fighting which was given by Polybius.

#### APPENDIX I. THE BATTLE OF 364 BC (see FIG. 4)

Since Plutarch mentioned the Thetideum and the Cynoscephalae in his account of this battle, we must see if our identifications are compatible with its details. Our first problem is the number of hoplites on each side. Pelopidas intended to take—but was prevented by an eclipse of the sun on 13th July 364 BC from taking—7,000 Boeotian citizen troops, i.e. hoplites (Plu. *Pel.* 31.4; D.S. xv 80.2). We infer from this that Pelopidas' Thessalian allies were weak in hoplites and that Alexander had at least 7,000 well-trained hoplites. We can then accept the statement in Plu. *Pel.* 32.1 that Alexander had 'more than twice as many hoplites as the Thessalians.' On this admittedly insecure basis we may estimate Alexander's hoplites at some 8,000 and the Thessalian hoplites at some 3,000. Pelopidas had 300 excellent cavalrymen, volunteers from Boeotia, and 'many good' Thessalian cavalrymen (Plu. *Pel.* 31.4 and 32.2), so that he was somewhat superior in this arm. Pelopidas brought also 'mercenaries' (Plu. *Pel.* 31.4), perhaps hoplites because that was what he needed. Both sides are likely to have had many light-armed troops. The only total, 'more than 20,000 soldiers' in Alexander's army (D.S. xv 80.4), was probably inflated to the greater glory of Pelopidas; for in a eulogistic summary Diodorus had the army of Alexander 'many times as numerous' as that of Pelopidas (81.3), which is a wild exaggeration.

The main account is in Plutarch, *Pelopidas*. It is remarkable for six instances of the verb 'to see'. I infer that the ultimate source was a eyewitness or eyewitnesses on Pelopidas's side;<sup>34</sup> and it is the lines of sight which help us to understand the development of the action. I paraphrase and comment on Plutarch's account.

From Pharsalus Pelopidas 'was marching towards Alexander' (32.1). In order to do so, Pelopidas crossed the Enipeus near Vasile and moved into the northern part of the plain. He thus covered his line of supply from Pharsalus. Alexander, whose line of supply came from Pherae down the Enipeus valley, was somewhere in the plain northeast of Vasile; for being superior in hoplites he wished to fight on level

<sup>32</sup> In *RE* xii 1.35.

<sup>33</sup> He identified the river Onchestus with the stream by Mikron Perivolakion, which Kromayer found to be dry in April—not much use for thirsty men and horses.

<sup>34</sup> The account of Diodorus was 'certainly founded on Ephorus' (H. D. Westlake in *CQ* xxxiii [1939] 17), a

contemporary pro-Pelopidas writer, and 'the agreement (between Diodorus and Plutarch) is closest in the two accounts of operations in Thessaly' (*ibid.* 18). Plutarch, then, also used Ephorus for our battle; it is unlikely that he went beyond Ephorus to consult e.g. Callisthenes.




FIG. 4. The Battle of Cynoscephalae in 364 BC

Key:

- A Alexander in person
- A-L I Alexander's Light Infantry at the beginning
- A-L II . . . . . at the final stage
- Inf I Pelopidas' infantry in column at the beginning
- Inf II . . . . . holding the heights at the final stage
- K Kremaste
- P Pelopidas personally
- Ph I Alexander's phalanx of hoplites in line facing west at the beginning
- Ph II Alexander's phalanx in column at the final stage
- ⊖ Thetideum (Sanctuary of Thetis)
- Π I Pelopidas' cavalry at the beginning
- Π II . . . . . at the final stage
- Seasonal streams

ground, and he was able to rest the right wing of the hoplite phalanx on the foothills which his light-armed infantry was holding and protect the left wing with his cavalry out in the plain.<sup>35</sup> When Alexander saw Pelopidas cross the river and observed that Pelopidas was accompanied by 'a few Thebans' (viz. the 300 cavalrymen), Alexander 'was going to the Thetideum to meet him' (ἀπήντα πρὸς τὸ Θετίδειον). I take it that Alexander as commander was on the right wing of the hoplite phalanx, and that he hoped to fight a set battle in the plain, Pelopidas and his Theban cavalry were evidently either on the right of the head of his column of march, or else in advance of the left of his line, if his infantrymen were deployed; for only then could Alexander have seen Pelopidas.

The last thing Pelopidas wanted was a set battle of hoplites in the plain. He therefore sent the head of his column up the valley which lies west of the Kremaste ridge, so that it passed out of sight of Alexander; at the same time Pelopidas and his Theban cavalry rode along the lowest part of the Kremaste ridge and were in sight of Alexander (see FIG. 4, Phase I). As the engagement was shortly to develop in the foothills, Plutarch described the ridges which came down from the watershed to the space between the two armies. 'Ridges which were sloping on all sides and high ran in an opposite direction to the space between' (i.e. between the two armies), 'down the so-called Cynoscephalae.' (ἀντιτεινόντων δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεσὸν κατὰ τὰς καλουμένας Κυνοῦς κεφαλᾶς λόφων περικλιῶν καὶ ὑψηλῶν). See pp. 67–8 above and n. 20 for my interpretation of this passage. The Cynoscephalae here are the various sections of the watershed ridge.

Pelopidas hoped to dislodge the light-armed infantrymen of Alexander from the foothills, occupy them himself and attack the main force of Alexander from its flank. On the other hand, Alexander was determined to hold the foothills, and he therefore sent a reinforcement of infantry to the upper part of the Kremaste ridge and the watershed ridge. Pelopidas then ordered his leading infantry to attack the enemy and capture the Kremaste ridge. While the infantry were moving forward, Pelopidas wheeled his cavalry to his right and charged the enemy cavalry, which had evidently come up the valley west of the Thetideum and was protecting Alexander's infantry line. The charge was successful. The cavalry of Pelopidas pursued the enemy cavalry 'into the plain' (εἰς τὸ πεδίου). But his hoplites failed to force their way to the high ground (πρὸς . . . μετέωρα χωρία βιαζομένοις), and were having no success.

At this point Pelopidas, who had not joined in the cavalry pursuit but was on the lower part of the Kremaste ridge, sent an order to his cavalry to return from the plain and attack 'that part of the enemy which was in formation' (τὸ συνεστηκὸς τῶν πολεμίων),<sup>36</sup> which I take to be Alexander's hoplite phalanx. It seems, then, that this phalanx had moved in column from the plain and was advancing up the valley which lies west of the Thetideum (see FIG. 4). But some time was needed for the order to reach the cavalry and for the cavalry to return. During that time Pelopidas went into action himself. 'He ran to join those who were fighting around the ridge, mingled with them, took a shield at once, pushed his way through the rear ranks into the front line, and inspired such vigour and eagerness into them, that the enemy thought that another group, different in physique and spirit, was coming up.'

The enemy repelled two or three attacks. However, they yielded and retreated gradually, when they saw not only these infantrymen attacking in good heart but also the cavalrymen returning from the pursuit.<sup>37</sup> It was now the turn of Pelopidas and his infantrymen to hold the high ground of Kremaste and the watershed ridge. 'He saw from the heights that the whole of the enemy army was full of turmoil and confusion though not yet inclined to flight. He stood still and looked around for Alexander. When he saw Alexander exhorting and arranging the mercenaries on the right, he did not control his passion by any reasoning.' He rushed far ahead of his own men to challenge Alexander (see FIG. 4, Phase II).

Alexander was evidently at the head of the column of hoplites, which had by now reached the upper part of the valley and was immediately below Pelopidas. He sheltered behind his men. Pelopidas cut down several of them, but he was already wounded when his own men came running from the ridge to help him. At the same time the cavalry, using the level valley bottom, rode up and went into the attack. The hoplites of Alexander broke and fled. The cavalry pursued over a great distance, and more than 3,000 of Alexander's army were killed.

<sup>35</sup> If Alexander had as many as 8,000 hoplites and we allow a metre to each man in a phalanx 8 men deep, his line was about one kilometre in length. That this number of hoplites is about right is shown by his alarm in 368 BC, when 8,000 Boeotian hoplites moved against him (D.S. xv 71.3).

<sup>36</sup> See *LSJ* s.v. 'συνίστημι' B I, citing *X. An.* vi 5.28–30.

<sup>37</sup> They saw the cavalry, when the cavalry appeared at the foot of the valley, or on the western side of the ridge opposite Hill 260.

I turn now to the account of Diodorus, which is brief by comparison. It seems that he and Plutarch used the same source for the battle,<sup>38</sup> but that Diodorus limited himself to points which highlighted Pelopidas. Thus Diodorus proceeded at once to Alexander gaining possession of the high ground (προκατειλημμένον τούς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους; cf. Plu. *Pel.* 32 ἔφθη καταλαβὼν τούς λόφους) and having the initial advantage of a superior position (διὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τῶν τόπων πλεονεκτοῦντος; cf. Plu. *Pel.* πρὸς . . . μετέωρα χωρία βιαζομένοις). Diodorus omitted the unsuccessful attack by the Thessalian infantry, the recall of the cavalry by Pelopidas, and the withdrawal of Alexander's infantry (Plu. *Pel.* 32.3–5); for he went at once to Pelopidas' attack on Alexander (ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὤρμησε τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) and on his picked troops (τῶν ἐπιλέκτων, cf. Plu. *Pel.* τῶν μισθοφόρων), and then to Pelopidas' heroic death. Additional colouring and perhaps some exaggeration of the odds against Pelopidas may be attributed to Diodorus, who liked to add a rhetorical flavouring of his own.

The account of Nepos, *Pelopidas*, mentions Pelopidas' rage and his attack on Alexander personally, and his outstripping his companions (incensus ira . . . proculque digressus a suis; cf. Plu. *Pelop.* πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαλόμενος). In this account, as in Plutarch's, Pelopidas is said to have seen Alexander (Alexandrum ut animadvertit: Plu. *Pelop.* ὡς εἶδεν), and to have charged at him. Pelopidas outstripped his men presumably because he was on horseback and they were on foot.

Two phases of the battle are shown on FIG. 4. Alexander's detachment of infantry occupied and held the watershed ridge and the spur and the upper part of the ridge by Kremaste. It was in order to support this detachment that Alexander moved his main force of infantry up the valley between the western ridge and the eastern ridge (see PLATE 1c and 1f). Meanwhile his cavalry was covering his left flank as he marched in column up the valley bed. It was this cavalry which was driven down into the plain by Pelopidas' superior cavalry. (For the plain see PLATE 1e.) Pelopidas now delivered the second infantry attack on Kremaste; and his cavalry, which was returning from the plain at his command, was to attack the 'organised', i.e. main body of infantry from the south. Alexander's detachment withdrew down the eastern ridge. From his high position by Kremaste Pelopidas saw Alexander below him by the head of the valley between the two ridges; and as Alexander deployed his column into line, facing Pelopidas, the Theban commander charged down from near Kremaste at what was now Alexander's right wing (ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιῶ) (see PLATES 1b and 1f). Pelopidas fell mortally wounded. But the Thessalian infantry 'came at the run from the ridges to his aid', and the cavalry charging up (i.e. up the valley) routed the entire phalanx. The ridges from which the infantry ran were the western ridge by Kremaste and the watershed ridge which they had just captured. Thus the main body of Alexander was attacked at both ends—in the north by the infantry and in the south by the cavalry. When Alexander 'was going to the Thetideum to meet' Pelopidas, he got to the edge of the plain by Hill 260. The ridges on which the engagements occurred were the Cynoscephalae, 'The Dog-heads'.<sup>39</sup>

## APPENDIX II. THE DOG-HEADS

If we were told only of the name and not given any description, we should not know from which angle we were to envisage a dog's head. Given the nature of the terrain (see p. 69 above), I assume that the dog in question was a sheep-dog, as in PLATE 1a, and that the ridges were named 'Dog-heads' by shepherds. Thus the silhouette of the dog on PLATE 1 is suggestive with its long nose and very lowbrow head. We may compare the naming of the Mediterranean antirrhinum as 'dog-head', no doubt from the

<sup>38</sup> See n. 34. M. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala* (Rome 1958) 193–202 maintained that Plutarch followed Callisthenes for the battle, and that Diodorus followed Ephorus; however, Diodorus abbreviated drastically, and the little he does say in xv 80.4–5 seems to me to be in line with Plutarch's much fuller account.

<sup>39</sup> Kromayer 116–122 made no attempt at all to relate the detail of the battle to his location of the Cynoscephalae; instead, he indulged in his theory of an offensive wing and a defensive wing, which is not relevant to my understanding of the battle. Pritchett, placing the Thetideum at Ayios Athanasios (114–117),

located the battle on the ridge north of Sitochoron (118 with Fig. 12). Pritchett 119 brought the cavalry into action prematurely against 'the infantry on the hill'. Since Pritchett has put the scene of this battle and the scene of the battle of 197 BC at different locations, he has to plead as follows. 'No modern scholar can agree with this conclusion', expressed by Plutarch, who 'believed that both battles of Cynoscephalae, those of 364 BC and 197 BC, were fought on the same ground'. I beg to differ; for I think that Plutarch was the more informed on this matter.

profile of the bloom. Indeed the silhouette of the sheep-dog accords exactly with the description which Plutarch gave of the ridges (see p. 67 above). 'The so-called Dog-heads, which, being the slight tops of ridges close to and parallel to one another, are so named because of the similarity of the shape' (δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ σχήματος), i.e. the similarity of the ridge-shape to the dog's-head-shape. Thus 'the slight tops' (ἄκραι λεπταί) correspond to the low-brow head which rises only a little above the line of the ridge or the nose. In other respects too these ridges were well described in our sources, as we shall see if we look at PLATE 1b. For they are 'close to and parallel to one another', 'rough (? rough going for a phalanx), 'broken' (in the sense of undulating),<sup>40</sup> 'sloping on all sides' and 'attaining a considerable height' (see p. 67 above).

### APPENDIX III. THE ROMAN ENCAMPMENT

We know from Polybius xviii 18.1 that the Roman legionaries in Flamininus' army made a fortified encampment when they reached a point south of Pherae. Certainly, then, they did so when they encamped 'round the Thetideum' (xviii 20.6 and 21.2 στρατοπεδεύων περὶ τὸ Θετίδειον).

The one complete camp, which I measured roughly (see p. 71 above), would have accommodated about an eighth of a legion in comparison to Camp B at Masada, 180 × 140 yards, which in the opinion of Y. Yadin accommodated half a legion.<sup>41</sup> Of course, a one-night camp might have taken more men than a standing camp, as at Masada, would do. One would have needed sixteen such camps 'round the Thetideum' to accommodate the two legions. There was plenty of room for them on the southern slopes of the hill, which have been terraced and cultivated (see p. 72 above). What I saw on the first visit had survived because the particular piece of ground had not been cultivated or used as a cemetery. The alterations on the hilltop, which I saw on the second visit, are of uncertain character and may be left aside until an excavation is made. The surprising thing is that one complete camp and the corner of another are still visible. I was lucky to spot it in the right light at the right season.<sup>42</sup>

Polybius, writing probably of conditions c. 143 BC, described a permanent Roman camp as having a peripheral fortification of ditch and vallum (vi 34.1 τῶν φρεϊῶν καὶ χαρακωποιῶν) and unfortified unit-areas within it; and his description is borne out by a winter-camp of the early second century BC near Numantia.<sup>43</sup> Our camp is entirely different. The complete camp and the corner of the second are each fortified with ditch and vallum, and this means that they are not part of a permanent camp. Then, the layout within a permanent camp was regular, approximating to the grid-plan. At the Thetideum the complete camp and the corner of the second camp are not so aligned. The explanation of the differences is that Flamininus set each unit as it arrived to fortify its own unit-camp; for he was not making a permanent camp with a peripheral fortification.

Could the complete camp and the corner of the second camp have been made not in 197 BC but during the campaign and the battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC? Here we are helped by the excellent study of J. D. Morgan, which shows the various sites proposed by him and twelve other scholars for the main camp of Caesar and the main camp of Pompey.<sup>44</sup> Not one is at Zoodokhos Pege. Most are in the plain, some north of the river Enipeus and others south of it. Nor is our complete camp and the bit of a second one appropriate to a main camp, which would have had a strong peripheral fortification, as at Dyrrachium,<sup>45</sup> and not fortifications of each unit-camp within it.

<sup>40</sup> See the excellent note of Kromayer 67 n. 1 on περικεκλασμένοι. He compared the passage at Plb. ix 26.7, where hilly, flat and undulating (or uneven) sites for towns are contrasted. Kromayer translated as 'uneben'.

<sup>41</sup> Y. Yadin, *Masada* (Jerusalem 1966) 215-19

<sup>42</sup> F. L. Lucas in *BSA* xxiv (1921) 52, in his study of the battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC, wrote as follows. 'It is my regret that, though I must have walked a hundred miles up and down and round the Pharsalia, I found no

sign of Roman fortification.' Many others will have echoed those words.

<sup>43</sup> A. Schulten, *Numantia* iv (Munich 1929) 37 with Plans IIIa and IV, his Camp 1. For the plans of a permanent camp see *The Cambridge Ancient History* viii facing p. 322 and Walbank i 710.

<sup>44</sup> Morgan placed Caesar's camp in the plain on the north side of the river about opposite Vasile.

<sup>45</sup> See *CAH* ix 659 ff.; and for the camp in the plain of Pharsalus Caesar, *B.C.* iii 94.5 and 95.1-3.

The final possibility is that the complete camp and the bit of a second one form one of the *castella* which Pompey made away from his main camp (Caes. *B.C.* iii 88.5 and 99.4).<sup>46</sup> Now a *castellum* was a stronghold, whether natural or fortified (e.g. at iii 36.3). One pair are not a stronghold at all. They lie near the foot of a gentle slope, and the gate of the complete one faces downhill; they are not, as they should be, on the ridge-top or, better still, on the top of Hill 260. Then, if they are part of a *castellum*, why is each fortified? On most interpretations of the campaign Pompey's *castella* faced towards Caesar's troops. Ours face west and have no view to the east. Finally, one *castellum* was manned by probably one or at most two cohorts of Pompeians, if we note iii 88.5 'reliquas cohortes VII in castris propinquisque castellis praesidio disposuerat.' Our complete camp and a second camp of the same size would accommodate two cohorts comfortably; thus they cannot be a part only of such a *castellum*.

My conclusion, then, is that my study of the campaign and the battle of 197 BC did lead me to two surviving bits of the Roman encampment which Flamininus made 'round the Thetideum.' It is to be hoped that an excavation may prove whether this conclusion is right or wrong.

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<sup>46</sup> This possibility was pressed by J. D. Morgan in correspondence for which I am grateful.



(a) The author pointing north from the watershed ridge towards Lower Khalkiadhēs, where Philip had his camp. Note the silhouette of the sheep-dog's head.



(b) Looking westwards from Hill 362 towards Kremaste farm-buildings. The stand of cypresses on the right is on the watershed ridge. Philip deployed his phalanx troops on the flat area where the buildings are and then he charged down the very slight incline which is silhouetted to the left of the last farm-building.



(c) Looking southwards from a point just below the watershed ridge between Hill 340 and Kremaste (the clump of deciduous trees is visible low down in (b)). The head of the eastern ridge is on the extreme left and the gently declining western ridge runs from one's right towards the far centre of the photograph.




(d) The author and Dr Hatzopoulos beside the block at Kremaste below the stand of cypresses on the watershed ridge.




(e) Looking from the third flat area to the Roman camp beyond the nick of the two slopes. On the extreme left is Hill 260, and the plain lies just beyond the trees in the centre.



(f) Looking back from the third flat area to see Kremaste and the stand of cypresses beyond it, then the watershed ridge to Hill 362 (indicated by an arrow) and on the right the eastern ridge. The Roman maniples crossed the valley bottom and ascended the western ridge to attack the Macedonian phalanx from the rear.




(a) Looking back from a level part of the western ridge to Kremaste, the stand of cypresses and the watertank on Hill 362. The two last are on the watershed ridge to which Philip's troops ascended.



(b) Descending along the western ridge from Kremaste to the second flat area, on which the farm-track is visible. The continuation of the track appears on the third flat area. On the skyline, left of centre, one sees the tree-clad Hill 260.



(c) Looking eastwards from the third flat area, one sees on the extreme left the watertank on Hill 362, from which the eastern ridge descends gradually to the streambed on the extreme right.



(d) The complete Roman camp on the west side of tree-clad Hill 260. A ramp, supporting a 'via', runs along the lower side of the camp. Just below the ramp on the extreme right the angle of a second camp is visible. A modern farm-track is in the foreground. On top of the hill there is an electric transformer, and the single cypress is by the ruined church. The dark triangle on the left is ploughed land.